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Premature Perestroika: the Dutch Communist Party and Gorbachev 
 
The reaction of the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) to glasnost and perestroika, 
the reforms with which Soviet Party secretary Michael Gorbachev surprised the world after 
his coming to power in 1985, was in essence 'déjà vu'. Basically, the CPN believed that it had 
itself had gone through a process of reconstruction in the early eighties in a way which 
anticipated the reforms initiated in the Soviet Union, although, of course, the scale and setting 
were completely different. Because of its premature renovation, the CPN assigned itself a 
position in the modernizing avant garde of the international Communist movement. 
 In this chapter, the response of the CPN to Gorbachev will be described. Some 
attention, however, has to be paid first to the metamorphosis the CPN underwent at the 
beginning of the 1980s, especially with reference to its international standpoint and its 
reappraisal of Leninism and 'really existing socialism'. The changes which came about in this 
area were determinant in the attitude the CPN adopted later. In addition, the somewhat 
ambivalent reactions to the downfall of Eastern European socialism within the CPN will be 
discussed. Although the Dutch Communists had already decided in principle on co-operation 
with the Radical Party (PPR) and the Pacifist-Socialist Party (PSP) within the framework of a 
new environmental polical formation called 'Green Left' (Groen Links), the tearing down of 
the 'iron curtain' certainly contributed to the decision to merge completely with PPR and PSP 
in Green Left and to dissolve the CPN in June 1991. Hence before describing the modernized 
CPN of the eighties, its existence as an orthodox Communist Party and in particular its less 
orthodox relation to the Soviet Union must be examined. From the early sixties to the middle 
of the seventies, the CPN was one of the byways of the international Communist movement. 
During this period, the CPN distanced itself from Moscow's leading role within world 
Communism (although it did not dissociate itself from Soviet theory and practice), later on 
the CPN would boast of this 'autonomous' position and describe itself as ‘pioneering’.  
 
The Orthodox CPN 
 
The history of the CPN stretches back to before the Russian Revolution. In the Netherlands, 
the split between reformists and revolutionaries within the labour movement had already 
taken place in 1909. This gave the CPN a certain independence when the Communist 
International was set up. However, Moscow quickly gained control of the Dutch Communists, 
like every other Party it was 'bolshevised' by the mid-1920s.  
 After the Second World War, the CPN returned to legality as the political satellite of 
the Soviet Union and during the Cold War, the party completely identified itself with 
Moscow. In international affairs, the CPN espoused the so-called 'theory of the two camps' 
and the CPN accused the capitalist camp, led by the United States, of preparing a third World 
War. Only through the efforts of the (by nature) peaceful Socialist camp headed by Moscow, 
said the CPN, this could be avoided. In this 'battle for peace' the CPN took part "in 
indissoluble solidarity with the Soviet Union." Not only because of its international role, but 
also because of its social system the Soviet Union was held to be a radiant example. The CPN 
reassured its adherents that the victory of socialism in the Soviet Union was attended "with 
the birth of a new type of human being...namely Socialist man, who as a priority believes the 
welfare of the community to be a precondition of his personal welfare." All these triumphs 
were attributed to Stalin, who was praised in the constitution of the CPN as "the greatest 
reformer of society, teacher and statesman, who has ever led progressive humanity."1 
 Destalinisation, which was started in 1956 by Khrushchev’s secret speech, shocked 
the Dutch Communists. The CPN executive announced that Stalin had made some mistakes, 
but was still very favourable about its Soviet mentor. Yet the party leadership regretted that it 
had defended the personality cult to the Dutch public, and stated that it would never again 
support actions in other countries if these fell outside of its area of knowledge."2 Non-
interference in other parties (confirmed by the Eigthteenth Congress of the CPN in October 
1956) was a prelude to the concept of 'autonomy' to which the CPN was converted in the 
sixties. Togliatti's concept of 'polycentrism', however, was strongly criticised by the CPN: the 
leading role of the Soviet Union was not in question. In fact, the CPN was plus royaliste que 
le roi. The introduction of the idea of 'noninterference' seemed to be dictated only by 
repugnance at Khrushchev's unmasking of Stalin and was an excuse for the party not to have 
to face the problem of destalinisation.  
 
The CPN as International Misfit 
 
In the sixties, the CPN was estranged from the Soviet Union because of the conflict between 
Moscow and Peking. In 1963, after the breakdown of the negotiations between the two 
Communist powers, party secretary De Groot declared the 'autonomy' of the CPN within the 
international Communist movement. The impulse behind this came from the possible rupture 
of the special relations between the Dutch Communists and the pro-Chinese Indonesian 
Communist Party, which could come about because of the Sino-Soviet dispute. These parties 
had engaged in a common struggle against the Dutch colonial system. On the ideological 
disputes between Khrushchev and Mao, De Groot stated that the conflict was essentially 
"about economic issues, about the balance of power within the Socialist camp and within the 
international Communist movement." From then on, the CPN would  be "responsible only to 
the working population of the Netherlands... Our international activities are only useful if they 
are made subservient to our primary tasks."3 
 Nevertheless, the CPN stuck to its view that the Socialist countries as such - including 
the Soviet Union - were the only factors promoting global peace and declared therefore that 
"the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence was an historical step forward."4 Moreover, 
the CPN did not turn pro-Chinese; the emerging Maoist tendency within the party was 
expelled overnight, as was a small pro-Soviet group. Moscow was held responsible for the 
rupture in the international movement and in consequence, relations with the Soviet Union 
worsened. International Communist meetings were attended either by a low ranking 
delegation or not at all. 1967, the CPN did not celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of the 
Russian Revolution and, one year later, the armed intervention of the Warsaw Pact in 
Czechoslovakia was strongly condemned as a "violation of Leninist principles".  
 
The Eurocommunist Curse 
 
After a short period of détente with Moscow around 1970, Dutch Communists' xenophobia 
continued: the CPN isolated itself and was viligant against "hostile interventions."5 But it kept 
aloof not just from orthodox Parties, but also from the 'Eurocommunist' Italian, French and 
Spanish Parties which were trying to modernise. The CPN perceived in this European 
framework a new (Italian) 'centre', which was regarded as a threat to its 'autonomous' position. 
However, the CPN boasted that it had introduced the concept of 'autonomy' in the 
international Communist movement, long before 'Eurocommunists' were claiming a greater 
degree of independence from Moscow. 
 In the middle of the 1907s, this position of self-chosen isolation started to change: 
slowly but surely the CPN made its entry onto the international scene. In June 1976 it took 
part in the conference of European Communist Parties in East-Berlin and supported the 
resolution in which the 'autonomy' and 'independence' of all Parties was defended.6 The 
importance the conference attached to the concept of 'autonomy' as one of the basic rules of 
mutual relations within the international Communist movement was regarded as a victory by 
the CPN. Sticking to its principles, it refused to take a stand in the dispute between the 
Eurocommunist parties on the one hand and the Moscow-orientated orthodox ones on the 
other. In reality, the Dutch Communists praised the 'international peaceloving policy' of the 
Soviet Union and condemned 'reactionary interference in the internal affairs of the Socialist 
countries'.7  
 
Renewal of the CPN 
 
This temporary public courtship of the CPN with the CPSU did not bring electoral good 
fortune. In May 1977, the CPN lost five out of seven seats and instead of participation in 
government, which the party had demanded, Dutch Communism became politically marginal. 
This electoral defeat, however, ushered in a period of profound ideological change. First the 
party shook off its Stalinist coat and went on to renounce its Leninist heritage: 'Leninism' was 
abolished both as a theory and as an organisational model. At the same time, the new social 
movements managed a hold on the CPN and during the eighties an entirely new party made 
its appearance, which merged into a new political formation called 'Green Left' at the end of 
the decade. In this landslide, the traditional view of the Socialist countries changed 
profoundly and the principle of the 'two camps' also perished. 
 The CPN's metamorphosis was preceded by a change in the social composition of its 
membership.8 Within the Communist membership industrial workers were replaced by 
members of the 'new middle class', who were promoting new, 'post-materialist' demands like 
protection of the environment and democratisation and were less attached to the Soviet 
Union. The newcomers conformed to the rules and traditions of the Stalinist party at first but 
after the disastrous parliamentary elections in 1977, intellectuals and (later) feminists rebelled 
against the Stalinist cadres and demanded more freedom of discussion and ideological 
renewal.9 The strife between the orthodox wing and the renovators ended in a victory for the 
latter. Under the pressure of the combined opposition of intellectuals and feminist members, 
Leninist ideology was thrown overboard in 1984; the abolition of the Leninist principle of 
demoratic centralism followed five years later.  
 The new era was ushered in at the Twent-sixth Congress of January 1978. Here the 
strategic concept of the 'coalitions formation' was unfolded. Communists, Socialists, 
Progressive Christians and others were urged to link up to form an alternative to the centre-
right coalition. Apart from parties, all kinds of social organizations were invited to contribute 
to this so-called 'democratic power formation'. Apart from these strategic changes a new 
ideological programme was announced in which the CPN would map out the 'Dutch road to 
socialism'.  
 Though the CPN seemed to adopt a different tone, it initially remained Marxist-
Leninist: something which became manifest in its attitude towards the Socialist countries. In 
accordance with its 'autonomous position', the CPN did not defend everything happening in 
Eastern Europe, but it condemned "the reactionary interference in the internal affairs of the 
Socialist countries." It admitted that there were 'unsolved problems', 'contradictions in the 
internal development' and 'common difficulties' in the Eastern bloc, but at the same time it 
stated that "no party had the right to interfere in another party's affairs."10 
 The CPN remained committed to the orthodox 'theory of the two camps', in which the 
United States was escalating the arms race whereas the Soviet Union was pursuing a policy of 
détente, and was the power supporting the masses struggling for peace. Hence, "the Socialist 
countries are indispensable allies of the Dutch working class in the struggle against the 
dangers of the arms race."11 At the beginning of the eighties, this Moscow-dominated stand 
was still predominant within the CPN: the bracketing of the Soviet Union with the United 
States as jointly responsible for the arms race was rejected. Any analysis which put the Soviet 
Union and the United States on a par ignored all distinctions between 'bellicose' capitalism 
and 'peace-loving' socialism, according to the CPN.12  
 
Changes in International Policy 
 
Within a few years, however, the CPN had changed this 'theory of the two camps' precisely 
for the traditionally-abused 'theory of the superpowers'. Though this volte-face in its 
international position was a part of the general metamorphosis the CPN was experiencing, 
two factors in particular played a role. In the first place were events which took place in the 
early eighties such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the military coup in Poland and the 
war between Vietnam and China. Then there was the succes of the Netherlands peace 
movement, which the CPN had initiated, and which led to a kind of merger with the broader, 
less radical peace movement. At the same time, the CPN itself was drawn in a more 'neutral' 
direction.  
 In August 1977, the CPN started a wide campaign against the introduction of the 
neutron bomb which, apart from its direct aim was also intended to improve the morale of the 
Communist rank and file after the electoral disaster. The campaign proved to be a success; 
within nine months the Communists had collected more than a million signatures. The 
campaign improved the prestige of the CPN within the international Communist movement 
and contributed to the breaking of its isolation. Moreover, the Dutch Parliament was against 
the N-bomb and the Communist leadership decided to extend the campaign to the arms race 
as a whole; the Twenty-seventh Congress of the CPN of June 1980 made the 'struggle for 
peace' a priority. The 'Stop the N-bomb, stop the arms race' committee took part in the 
developing broader peace movement in the early eighties and campaigned against the 
stationing of American Pershing II's and cruise missiles in the Netherlands in the first place, 
but the Soviet SS-20's were also criticised. Of course the leadership of 'Stop the N-bomb' 
could not do less without isolating itself and losing its gains; hence it made concessions to the 
peace movement. 
 Criticism of Soviet nuclear armament was facilitated by the change of the 
international policy. The unshakable faith in the 'peaceableness of the Socialist forces' was 
damaged firstly by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The invasion was indirectly 
denounced after some weeks of silence. The Communist Member of Parliament (and 
éminence grise) M. Bakker described the "one-sided military" Soviet way of acting as "an ill-
fated decision", though in the last resort the United States was held responsible. The 
credibility of 'really existing socialism' received another blow from the military coup d'état in 
Poland. Immediately after Jaruzelski had seized power in December 1981, the coup and the 
subsequent repression of Solidarity were condemned by the CPN "unconditionally and 
unequivocally."13 The involvement of the CPSU in a neigbouring country was also rejected as 
"an intervention in Polish affairs." In an alaboration the director of the scientific bureau of the 
CPN repudiated the argument that the Polish military had to intervene in order to protect the 
safety of the Warsaw Pact as a whole. The CPN rejected the idea that "the interests of the 
blocs - and within these those of the strongest powers - are decisive".14  
 Thus in the early eighties, the CPN gradually abandoned the dogma of the Socialist 
bloc as its natural ally in the 'anti-imperialist' struggle. In fact, socialism as a mobilising 
theme was replaced by the peace movement. This simultaneous emancipation and revaluation 
was partly the result of the relative success of the Communist campaign against the N-bomb 
and the rise of the broader peace movement. The CPN argued that the maintenance of the 
balance of power between both superpowers had not resulted in a lasting peace; henceforth 
the mass struggle for peace in the capitalist world was held to be decisive. However, the view 
of both the Soviet Union and the United States as joint instigators of the arms race and 
dominators of their 'blocs' was contested within the CPN. The orthodox argued that the 
ideological disorientation of the CPN had resulted in the merger of 'Stop the N-bomb' into the 
'pacifist, neutralist, and classless' peace movement; only a return to class-consciousness in 
international affairs could open a new perspective and the positive anti-imperialist 
contribution of the Soviet Union and the partition of the world within two camps had to be 
accepted.15 However, at the Twenty-eigth Congress of the CPN in November 1982, the 
orthodox wing suffered a heavy defeat. The Congress did not endorse the Soviet Union as an 
"automatic and natural ally in the struggle against the arms race."16 The party recognised that 
the existence of both hostile political-military blocs, one under the leadership of the United 
States and the other headed by the Soviet Union, had induced the arms spiral (although the 
CPN still saw the United States as the engine of the arms race). In order to halt escalation, 
both blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, had to be dissolved.  
 Building on the Congress resolution which had put the peace struggle at the top of the 
agenda, the CPN started a diplomatic offensive within the International Communist and left-
wing movement. This policy was consistent with its domestic coalition strategy: the CPN had 
contacts not only with ecologist movements elsewhere and with Polish Solidarity, but also 
with the CPSU and other orthodox Communist Parties. Moscow in its turn was interested in 
the CPN because of the hesitations the Dutch goverment manifested about stationing 
American missiles in the Netherlands. To their Soviet interlocutors the Dutch Communists 
made no secret of their disgust with the concept of equal military parity between East and 
West and the CPN advocated the dissolution of the blocs. In discussions with the CPSU, the 
Dutch party stated that it "did not believe the SS-20's to be a contribution to Dutch safety."17 
Despite the change of line, some members of the renovating wing in the CPN believed that 
the party was too Moscow-minded and broke away (like Member of Parliament G. 
Schreuders). 
 
Criticism of One-party System 
 
The emancipation of the CPN from international Soviet policy was accompanied by a 
dissociation from the socio-political system. This criticism of the one-party system was also a 
part of the CPN’s transformation. In this process of detachment, the Polish military coup 
d'état by General Jaruzelski was again a catalyst. The intervention of the Polish military had 
demonstrated the "bankruptcy of the authoritarian statist model of socialism."18 According to 
the CPN in its denunciation, the Polish Communist Party had blocked a real renovating 
popular movement and had in this way demonstrated the failure of the one-party-system. In 
the eyes of the Dutch Communists, democracy started from power sharing and coalitions. 
Restoration of all democratic rights in Poland was demanded, including the freedom of trade 
unions. 
 In the wake of the Polish events, the monolithic and totalitarian structures in Eastern 
Europe became increasingly the subject of criticism, which focussed on the monopoly of 
power by a small group within the apparatus of party and state. At the same time, the CPN 
attached greater value to the unfolding new social movements in the Netherlands such as 
women's liberation, environmental, anti-nuclear and peace movements as partners within the 
hoped-for coalitions. Correspondingly, the dissident political groups in Eastern Europe which 
took a stand against the Socialist regimes came into its view - not only as possible alternatives 
to the one-party-state, but also as possible allies against the division of Europe into two blocs. 
This development culminated in the Twenty-eigth Party Congress of the CPN in November 
1982, when the CPN expressed its sympathy with "the democratic opposition movements in 
Eastern European countries" and decided "not to maintain relations with the Polish and 
Czechoslovakian Communist Party in the circumstances."19  
 
The New 'Marxist-Feminist' Party Programme of 1984  
 
The criticism of the international position of the Soviet Union by the CPN and its related 
verdict on the domestic affairs in the 'Socialist motherland' were laid down in an entirely new 
declaration of principles which was ratified by the extraordinary congress of February 1984. 
In this declaration Leninism was exchanged for feminism as one of the 'sources of inspiration' 
of the CPN. Though Marxism survived, the idea of 'class-struggle' as the sole motor of history 
was abandoned. Instead of the sole clash between capital and labour, the declaration 
recognised the existence of various other 'contradictions', such as the ones between the 
genders, between man and nature, between North and South, and between hetero- and 
homosexuality. The CPN declared that it was opposed to the mixing of the policy of the state 
with religion or a specific ideology and rejected the identification of state with party." It 
supported the multi-party system as "essential to a democratic way of decision-making. 
Within socialism, constitutional rights... have to be guaranteed to every party, whatever their 
social views."20 
 In the new declaration of principles, there was no lauditory reference to the Soviet 
Union. The CPN accepted the clash between West and East, but it did not side with one of the 
protagonists. Instead it committed itself to a 'new Socialist internationalism', which was aimed 
at the dissolution of the international blocs. In the CPN's programme, Moscow and 
Washington were again held jointly responsible for the arms race, although it was thrust upon 
the Socialist countries, which had "overestimated the role of military force within 
international relations too and underestimated the consequences of military might on the 
attractiveness and development of socialism."21 Renovating movements within 'really existing 
socialism' were pressured by the authorities who were manipulating the perception of an 
imperialist threat. The CPN expressed its support for these dissident democratic groups om 
Eastern Europe. 
 Immediately after the CPN Congress, the conservative wing proceeded to found the 
League of Communists of the Netherlands (Verbond van Communisten in Nederland: VCN). 
An orthodox manifesto was drawn up, based on rigid Marxist-Leninist principles such as the 
leading role of the Communist Party, a positive view of 'really existing socialism' and 
unconditional loyalty to the Soviet Union as the "fortress of peace and progress."22 The CPN 
was charged with 'revisionism and defeatism', because it had underestimated the power of the 
Socialist countries in the 'anti-imperialist battle'. The VCN asserted that by denying the class 
character of the struggle for peace and seeing Moscow and Washington as similar super 
powers, the CPN had slid down to "neutralism, anti-Sovietism and opportunism."23 Hence, as 
a result of the CPN's politics, the position of the United States and NATO was objectively 
strengthened. 
 
Perestroika before the word 
 
By the middle of the eighties, the CPN had been transformed. Its traditional concept of the 
Communist avant garde had been abandoned, the multiparty system had been embraced, 
democratic centralism had been repudiated and the party had been remodelled into a 
"democratic and feminist organisation",24 in which pluralism, respect for minority opinions 
and open decision-making processes were guaranteed. It was not so surprising that the 
Gorbachev reforms were well received within the CPN. In the following years, both the 
changes in the international policy of the Soviet Union and the domestic process of 
renovation, in which rigid bureaucratic centralism apparently made way for more democracy, 
were welcomed. After a period in which the orthodox Communist Parties were scornful of the 
renewal of the CPN, the Dutch Communists saw prospects for their rehabilitation. Former 
chairman H. Hoekstra, for instance, recalled the scepticism when talking to Eastern European 
officials about the transformation of the CPN in the early eighties. Now he was justified. "It 
cannot be denied that issues that we have put on the agenda were very relevant and are 
nowadays central problems everywhere - in the CPSU and other Communist Parties."25 
According to Hoekstra, the CPN had made the running in the international Communist 
movement by putting these vexing questions on the agenda.  
 Apart from this somewhat pretentious notion of having been one of the pioneers of the 
modern international Communist movement, the CPN claimed to have exercised an influence 
on Gorbachev's change of the Soviet Union's international policy, especially the abandonment 
of its objective of nuclear-strategic parity with the United States. With his strategy of de-
escalation, Gorbachev had rejected the search for parity of military power between the two 
superpowers, at least as the CPN saw it. This renunciation of the reliance on increasing 
armaments in order to maintain peace was regarded as a "'Copernican revolution' in the 
political-military way of thinking" of a superpower.26 Now Gorbachev had tried to stop the 
war of attrition by offering fundamental concessions in order to reduce arms, despite 
American efforts to step up the race again by announcing the deployment of Euromissiles and 
the Strategic Defense Initiative. 
 When the arrms race ended, the CPN considered itself one of the pacemakers in the 
Communist world. It took it for granted that conversations which were held with the CPSU in 
previous years had contributed to this change of direction. The official representative of the 
CPN at the Twenty-seventh Congress of the CPSU argued that "the discussions, the 
sometimes critical dialogue which the CPN had with the CPSU, have had a positive 
influence."27 In the CPN's view, the underlying factor of Moscow's transformation of foreign 
policy was the growing awareness within the Soviet leadership that the ‘imperialist’ United 
States could not be stopped without the support of the peace movement of the capitalist 
countries. The Kremlin's analysis was believed to be a recognition of the stand which the 
CPN had taken for years: in order to establish a strong peace movement, Dutch Communists 
had not been willing to subordinate the struggle for peace to the 'class struggle' and had 
criticized the Western and Eastern contribution to the nuclear arms race. By exceeding narrow 
class bounds, the coalitions for peace could be broadened to the full.  
 
Downfall of Socialism in Eastern Europe 
 
Despite the renovation of the CPN, its distant from the Soviet Union and the subsequent 
departure of the orthodox wing, traditional affinity with Moskow still had not disappeared 
within the party. In welcoming Gorbachev, some within the CPN nourished hopes that Soviet 
communism might be able to renew itself. Members of the old guard were cherished these 
expectations. Bakker asked himself whether "communism might again become a fascinating 
ideal... because of this large Socialist state, the Soviet Union?"28 Others also hoped that 
Gorbachev's efforts to add democracy to the 'really existing Socialist system' might increase 
the political appeal of Socialist ideology. Remarkably, opinion about the Soviet Union 
became more positive again within the party as a whole even though Moscow seemed to have 
been definitively "eradicated as a source of inspiration within the CPN" in previous years.29   
 The main reason for a revaluation of the USSR was that despite all the criticisms, the 
CPN still believed the Soviet socio-economic system to be essentially Socialist. An open-
minded, fundamental and critical analysis of the socio-political structure of the 'really existing 
socialist' countries had never been undertaken, despite the party's ideological renovation. Its 
traditional outlook on the Soviet Union in this sense was demonstrated very clearly at the 
Seventieth celebration of the October Revolution in 1987. A special issue of the theoretical 
magazine of the CPN was dedicated to the "first succesful Socialist revolution." Moreover, at 
the international celebration in Moscow in November, the CPSU wished "much success in the 
building of socialism".30 Soviet society was ‘Socialist’, for better or for worse; for the CPN 
the formal possession of the means of production by the community was apparently a 
sufficient basis for socialism. 
 
The CPN between VCN and Green Left 
 
Partly as a consequence of this second but partial revaluation of the Soviet Union within the 
CPN, a rapprochement appeared to be under way between the renovating and orthodox 
currents Dutch communism. The CPN believed that Gorbachev’s policy was in line with its 
own policy in the early eighties. The VCN, which had followed the Soviet Union slavishly, 
hailed the political changes under Gorbachev as a proof of the renovating capacities of 
Leninism. Yet despite its insistence, the CPN (which was not represented in the Second 
Chamber since the elections of 1986) was not willing even to consider a reunion. Instead of 
merging with the orthodox Communists, the CPN entered in an electoral coalition with 
Radicals (PPR) and Pacifists (PSP).31 Under the banner 'Green Left' these parties - together 
with a small Progressive Christian partij and the representatives of new social movements - 
took six out of 150 seats, three more than the component parts had acquired separately in the 
previous elections. Dutch Communists re-entered the Second Chamber after an absence of 
three years. After the elections, the organisational development of Green Left was continued 
at the expense of the independence of the participating parties and in November 1990, a new 
party, Green Left, was officially founded. This party tried to combine ecological, 'green' 
demands aimed at environmental protection with traditional left-wing, 'red' issues like a just 
income distribution. The 'old' parties have all dissolved themselves in 1991, including the 
CPN (on 15 June). 
 
Desintegration of Eastern Europe in 1989 
 
Partly because of the hopes which were entertained for the possible appearance of a 
revitalised socialism of high moral standing as the result of glasnost and perestroika, the 
revolutions behind the Iron Curtain at the end of 1989 were a cold shower for the CPN. Of 
course the Dutch Communists were pleased with the desintegration of the first of the two 
political blocks in Europe, which was consistent with their international objective. At last the 
spirit of peace came down on earth, but at the same time the Last Judgement was passed on 
the 'really existing socialism'. The events which led to the breaking up of the Warsaw Pact, 
shed an harsh light on the way socialism had operated in practice. And because the CPN had 
stuck (from its early days) to the dogma that Eastern European societies were still Socialist in 
a way, the party was hit very hard by the destruction of the Iron Curtain. In general, the 
reaction was one of disillusionment. I. Brouwer, the last Chair of the Communist 
parliamentary group in the Second Chamber, wrote shortly after the events in February 1990: 
"What do you mean, socialism? Just a short time ago, the October Revolution of 1917 
produced a worthy successor in the Revolution of 1989, which desposed away the ruling 
Communist Parties or compelled them to abdicate."32 Socialism turned out not to have been a 
guarantee against unemployment, poverty, environmental destruction and so on, but appeared 
to have been morally corrupt and bankrupt. Of course this was not unsuspected, but the bare 
truth which was revealed went far beyond what had been imagined. 
 Within the CPN a debate started in 1990 about the practice of socialism, in which 
fundamental questions were not evaded. The concept of the ‘Communist vanguard’ in 
particular was identified behind the Eastern European abuses and the besmirching of elevated 
Socialist ideals. Yet the CPN’s affinity with the Eastern European social systems (despite all 
its criticisms), was not questioned during these discussions. Avoiding this painful self-
analysis, the CPN turned away from the Eastern European Socialist variant - losing an illusion 
but not abandoning its ideals, as the party executive made clear at the beginning of 1991, a 
few months before the congress was going to decide about the dissociation of the CPN: 
  
 The objective of the CPN was the accomplishment of a Socialist Netherlands by the 
democratisation of power. This aspiration was seriously hampered in the course of time by 
errors and abuses in the countries which called themselves Socialist... The fact that systems 
have existed in the world which called themselves Socialist and which are bankrupt politically 
and morally, is no reason the CPN to abandon its ideals, although it has to be recognised that 
the support within the Eastern European countries was far deeper than assumed in the past and 
that the basis for Socialist ideas has been narrowed considerably because of this crisis.33 
 
The end of Dutch Communism 
 
The history of the relations of the CPN with the Soviet Union is paradoxical. In the 
'autonomous' phase in the sixties and early seventies, the CPN had hardly any contacts with 
Moscow but followed in the ideological tracks of the CPSU. In the eighties, the CPN gave up 
Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and drifted away from the Soviet Union, but at the same time, 
however, contacts became more frequent than in the period after the Cold War. The 
traditional concept of socialism as a peace-loving global force could not with stand the drive 
to renovation after 1980. Yet the idea that the societies behind the Iron Curtain were in 
essence Socialist though in a rudimentary form survived the transformation and formed the 
link between the orthodox and the modernist phase in the relations with Moscow.  
 The fraternal thread was cut by the Götterdämmerung in Eastern Europe in 1989. Just 
before, the affinity with the Soviet Union had become larger again because of Gorbachev's 
reforms, in which the CPN recognised some of its own ideas. The impending end of the party-
state and the new era of détente gave rise to hopes of a Socialist renaissance. Yet after the 
downfall of Eastern European socialism, the party could not maintain the myth of 'really 
existing socialism' any longer and turned away.  
 Thus in 1991, the CPN dissolved itself and merged into Green Left. Its route to this 
new political formation, however, was traced out some time before 1989, though the speed of 
the merger - and the corresponding dissolution of the party - was accelerated by it. As the 
beginning when the CPN was not the consequence of the Russian Revolution of 1917 (the 
existing revolutionary Marxist Party merely changed its name), so in the end the death of the 
party was not caused by the Eastern European revolution of 1989 alone. Above all, the 
dissolution of the CPN was the product of an 'autonomous' development, which - viewed in 
retrospect - was ushered in by the 'premature perestroika' Dutch communism went through in 
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